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ABSTRACT
By 1981, Japan achieved both internal and external
equilibrium; exports and imports roughly balanced at
sixteen percent of the gross national product. However,
within the country, there was concern that the growth
in the government, accompanied by raising budget
deficits, would make it impossible for the economy to
core with a future crisis similar to the oil price
shocks of the seventies. The Chairman of Keidaren,
Mr. Doko, called for a 'philosophy of preservarice'
requiring government austerity and individual sacrifice.
The expected crises never occurred but the policies
followed led to a balance of payment surplus. Scientific
studies toI.determine the exact sources of these imbalances
are few but indications are that forty percent of the
gap was due to differences in growth in demand at home
and abroad, thirty percent due to differences in the
elasticity of import and export functions and thirty percent
due to movement in the exchange rate.
It is argued that political and economic frictions arise
when it it attempted to treat the symptom without reforming
the fundamental structure. Proper strategies can convert
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INTRODUCTIO?
Japan'success in coping with two rounds of skyrocketing oil
pricesin the 19705 has changed both her economic structure and
her competitiveness in the world market more than anything else.
The oil shocks were regarded in Japan as a declaration of "war"
and a "national emergency" to a country poor in raw materials and
arable land. By hard work and self—sacrifice the Japanese
reaction to the national emergency gave Japan the confidence to
be able to compete with any other country in the world.
*C.V.Starr Professor of Economics and Director of the
Center for Japan—U.S. Business and Economic Studies,
New York University.
2By 1981, Japan achieved virtual equilibrium, both internal and
external, and was ready to take on any challenge. By the end of
1970's, Japan invested almost twiceas much as the United
States in R & D to reduce energy cost, and to create newer and
younger vintages of capital stock in Japan. Overall investment
in Japan has grown much faster than overall investment in other
advanced countries. For instance, capital per unit of employment
during the period 1973—1979 increased at the average annual rate
of 6.1% in Japan, while in the United States it grew at the rate
of only 0.9% (Sato and Suzawa [1973 p. 161]).Japanese imports
and exports roughly balanced at the rate of 16% of CNP in 1981
and the excess of savings over domestic investment exactly
matched thegovernment's budgetdeficit, leaving domestic
effective demand and supply in complete equilibrium.
In the early 1980s there was a growing concern among government
officials and business groups, notably the Keidanren (the most
powerful federation of business organizations in Japan) that the
largegovernmentdeficitwouldeventually cripple the
government's ability to cope with the next round of national
emergency, and that the size of the government was becoming too
large. This.was the period when Mr. Inayama's "Caman—no—Tetsugaku"
("Philosophy of Perseverance") became the national motto. As
3Chairman of the Keidanren, Mr. Inayama advocated Gaman—no—
Tetsugaku and government austerity accompanied by further
individual sacrifice to prepare for future challenges to Japan.
The anticipated challenging years never arrived. Instead, both
falling oil prices and extremely brisk foreign demand for
Japanese products, accompanied by Reaganomics' large deficits of
the U.S. government budget, and high U.S. interest rates, became
unexpected windfalls to Japan. By the end of 1986, the
proportion of Japan's imports declined to 13% of ON? from the
high rate of 16% in 1981, while exports continued to grow at a
higher rate than the pre—Reagan era.The result is that Japan
has achieved trade surplus to the extent that no other country
has ever experienced. This is a story of "too much of a pleasant
surprise" and a story of unfulfilled challenge.Even though the
Japanese found that challenges anticipated around the beginning
of the 1980s did not come to past, Japan's export policy had
already driven them to "sell Japanese products by all means".
This is as though their accumulated internal power waiting for a
challenge had to be directed to something external.The result
was the export drive that the rest of the world observed as "so
disturbing".
The word"Gaiteki Fukinko"(external imbalance) started
appearing in several Japanese newspapers around the end of 1983.
There were fierce arguments on whether Japan's balance of
payments surplus was cyclical or structural.But around 1985,
it was generally recognized that the "Yushutsu Shiko" (export—
4prone) nature of the Japanese economy was largely responsible to
the persistent external surplus.
On October 31, 1985, the so—called Mayekawa Commission was
organized to study "economic structural adjustments for the
Promotion of international harmony", in short, to correct "tne
external imbalance of the Japanese economy". The commission
iSSsUed the report, the so—called "l4ayekawa Report" on April 7,
1986,which, for the first time in the post—1ar period, called
for transformation of the Japanese economy a saving—export
oriented to a consumption—import oriented economy.
The U.S.—Japan trade conflict has approached a critical point
as the Reagan Administration imposed 100% tariffs oncertain
Japanese products containing semiconductor chips in April, 1987.
This conflict has occurred by the fundamental structure of trade
relationship between the two nations and not by a mere flaw or
two in the policy or strategy of either side. It is assumed that
when a problem arises in the bilateral relationship which favors
one side against the other, correction of the disequilibrium will
result ina so—called "zero—sum" by shifting benefits from the
plus side to the minus side, thereby causing painand/or
sacrifice on the favored side and also instigating resistance
against the move. This happens when an attempt is made to treat
the symptoms without reforming the fundamental structure. I
believe that this type of solution must be replaced with more
creative ones which results in a "positive—sum" of benefits for
both sides. In what follows we will examine Japan—U.S. economic
Dimbalance from this point of view (i.e. how two countries can
cooporate the strategy and benefit from the action.)
2. Imoalance of Trade
During the 1950s the United States continued to accumulate
huge trade surplus each year, supported by its superiority of'
technology and undamaged economic structure.By the end of the
1960s, West Germany and Japan had completed their postwar
recovery process, and trade surpluses ensued.The 1970s is the
period during which the crude oil prices increased ten—fold,
butthe prices of industrial products increased only two—fold,
forcing the oil producing nations to accumulate large surpluses.
Duringthe l980s, the United States, oil producing nations and
exporting countries of primaryindustrial goodshave all
experienced trade deficits, while Japan, West Germany and some of
Newly Industrialized Countries ended up with huge surpluses.
Figure 1 depicts historical trends of trade (im)balances in the
U.S. and Japan.
Trade among various countries is determined by several factors
which include domestic and foreign demands, changes in relative
prices and exchange rates, tariffs, non—tariff barriers and etc.
Between 1983 and 1985, Japan's overall trade surplus increased by
almost $O billion, while the U.S.overall trade balance
deteriorated by more than $100 billion. Higher interest rates in
the U.S., resulting from a large Federal budget deficit, stronger
dollar (or weaker yen), andhigher growth rate of GNP in the
U.S. are said to be some of the factors responsible for the
6increased trade surplus for Japan and for the deterioration of
the U.S. trade position. Many also blame Japan for the
closedness of her domestic markets.
Scientific studies to determine the exact causes of the trade
imbalance are hard to come by.But a recent study by Japan's
Economic Planning Agency provides with the analysis of how the
causes of the Japan—U.S. trade imbalance may be broken down
(Economic Planning Agency [1986)). Using regression and factor
analysis, it is demonstrated that: (1) '40% of the imbalance is
due to the gaps in the growth of domestic and foreign demands
($'417 billion deficit out of $l.0007 billion for the U.S. deficit
and $162 billion surplus out of $393 billion for the Japanese
surplus); (2) the elasticity differences in the export and import
functions are also responsible for the trade imbalance; and (3)
the relative prices and exchange rate variations are additional
factors responsible for the imbalance (See Appendix 1).
7Table 1. Factor Analysis of the Rise of the
U.S. —JapanTrade Imbalance (1982—1985)
Japan U.S.A.
Trade Imbalance 393 (100%) —1,007(100%)
Due to Growth
Effects 162( 41%) —4l7( La%)
Due to Elasticity
Differences 126( 32%) —231( 23%)
Due to Exchange
Rates 120( 30%) —17L( 17%)
Due to Relative
Prices —59(—15%) — 122(127)
(Unit: 100 million)
Sources: Calculated from Economic planning Agency's
White Paper [1986].
Note:The sum of the factors shown here does not add to 100%
because of the omission of other "unexplained"factors.
8(1) Growth arid Income Effects:
2a and 2b show how divergences in the growth rates of domestic
and foreign demands in both the United Statesand Japan were
responsible for the drastic increase of trade imbalance. The
total domestic demandin Japan has steadily grown at an annual
rate of' '% for the period 1982—1985, which is approximately the
same rate as the average expected rate of growth calculated from
the trend line for the 1978—1985 period (the shadowed portion).
On the other hand, the foreign demand for Japanese products grew
much faster than the trend anticipated (2.6%).
A substantial increase in the foreign demand for the Japanese
goods came from the United States. Ihile the U.S. exports moved
along the trend line of 2.14%, the overall domestic demandin trie
U.S. exceeded its trend line of 2.2% by a substantial margin.
Given the fixed nature of the propensity to import,this
unprecedented rise in the domestic demand in the United States
provided the basis for a sharp increase in imports, especially
from Japan. As was observed in the previous section, this
unexpected and abnormal windfall gain in the export industryin
Japan gave a strong incentive for the export drive which oecame
the critical point in subsequent discussions of the U.S. —Japan
trade conflict.But the fact of' the matter is that the gaps in
the growth rates of domestic and foreign demands of the two
9the growth rates of domestic and foreign demands of the two
countries substantially contributed tothecurrent trade
friction.
(2) Exchange Rates —ExpensiveDollar and Cheap Yen:
Another major factor responsible for the trade imbalance
between Japan and the U.S. in the first half of the 1980s is the
overvalued dollar. According to the factor analysis presented in
Table 1, 32% of the increase in Japan's surplus is due to this
factor and 23% of the U.S. deterioration of the trade balance
resulted from the overvaluation of its currency. The high
evaluation of the U.S. dollar was sustained by high interest
rates reflecting the huge U.S. fiscal deficits.
(3)PriceEffects:
The declining prices of crude oil and other primary
products contributed to improvements in the trade balances in
both Japan and the U.S.But the overall effects of changes in
the prices of both export and import goods worked against both
Japan and the U.S. The export and import functions estimated for
this period seem to verify this assertion (See Economic Planning
Agency [1986],See Also Appendix 1).
('i)Elasticity Differences:
Table 2 compares the elasticities of imports and exports in
various countries. Je find that the import elasticity with
respect to income is the lowest (0.725) in Japan and the highest
(1.687) in the U.S. However, the export elasticity with respect
to income is the highest ('L207) in S. Korea, not in Japan
10(2.210) and the lowest in W.Germany (0.976), the U.S. case
(1.133) being slightly higher than W.Germany. In passing it is
noted that W. Germany is relatively balanced between exports and
imports as their elasticities have a smaller deviation.
Among the four countries compared, the U.S. is the only country
whose imbalance factor is less than one (0.67), which implies
that the U.S. tends to import more than they can afford, while




(A) Export (B) Liport (A/B)
Elasticity Elasticity Imbalance
with respect with respect Factor
to Income to Income
Japan 2.210 0.725 3.05
U.S.A. 1.133 1.687 0.67
1.Germany 0.976 0.803 1.22
S.Korea 14.207 0.7146 5.614
Source: Calculated from Ihite Paper [1986]
There is a multiplicative power in the accumulation of trade
11imbalances in any country. For example, other things being
equal, Japan can reduce its surplus if the domestic demand grows
at the rate of 14.5 times the growth rate of net world import
(1.14%) (i.e. Imbalance Factor x Growth Rate of World Import
3.05 x1.147% =14.148%).This means that Japan must grow at the
annual rate of approximately 7%.Conversely the U.S. can begin
to reduce it's trade deficit if the world imports is 2.5 times
the growth in its total domestic demand. These results
snow that the problem of imbalance has reached a level where
mere policy coordination can do little in correcting trade
imbalances.
3.Impact of Strong Yen
The value of the yen fell against the U.S. dollar between
Spring of 198'4 and Winter of'1985.After reaching a bottom of'
263.014yen per dollar on February 13, 1985, the Japanese currency
has appreciated by 147% to the current level of 139 yen per
dollar (May 12, 1987).
On the other hand, Japan's trade surplus has continued to rise
to a level close to $100 billion.What is happening here?
Economists often attribute this to a phenomenon called the "J—
curve effect" where a surplus in the value—base balance increases
temporarily due to a quantitative adjustment for the steep
upsurge of the dollar value of the yen.
The analysis contained in the 4hite Paper [1986) of the J—curve
effect, admittedly tentative, gives some insights into how the
huge surplus continues to exist for the Japanese economy.
12Following the final quarter of 1985, when the G—5 meeting took
place, the margin of surplus resultingfrom the combined
quarterly effects expanded to approximately $3 billions in the
second quarter of 1986 and reached some $4.l billions in the
fiscal year 1985. Although this is only 8% of the Japanese trade
surplus in 1985, the continued appreciation (rather than a once—
for—all appreciation of the yen) reflects various lags at work.
(Figure 3)
A certain period will be required before all the J—curve
effects or lags, are absorbed. How long it takes depends on the
speed of contract renewals and other factors such as: (i)
adjustment of transportanddistribution; (ii) inventory
liquidation; and (iii) change in production plans. One estimate
shows that (See Appendix 2) a lO yen rise will eventually reduce
export volume by 7.6%
Shafigul Islam (New York Times, May 12,1987) at the Institute
for International Economics claims that the appreciation of the
yen vis—a—vis the dollar is already working to reduce the trade
imbalance between the U.S. and Japan. The trade gap was only $1
billion higher in the last quarter of 1986 than a year earlier.
The dollar depreciation in general has already brought about the
improvements. The volume of American non—agricultural exports
rose 5% last year, and by the fourth quarter stood 9% above those
of the previous fourth quarter.Exports of capital goods and
consumer goods also enjoyed hefty increases.
4hile these improvements in trade volume will continue over the
13next several years, rising import prices will prevent a major
decline in the dollar deficit —theJ—curve effect. This does not
mean that the lower dollar has no effect on the trade imbalance.
The speed of adjustment for Japan has been so fast that
industrial production last year remained flat; profits and
investment in manufacturing plunged and lay—offs and unemployment
reached post—war highs.Japan's merchandise export volume fell
2% and import volume rose 13% last year.
The high yen shock called "Yen Daka Shokku", has brought
everything undesirable to Japan except the reduction of' a huge
trade surplus. The Japan Institute for Social and Economic
Affairs, the Keidanren's public relations and communication
branch, published a pamphlet titled"Tne Yen Shock" in March
1987, which describes how much Japan's economy has suffered from
the yen appreciation. It says that:
While domestic demand has stayed firm,
the strengthening of the yen has caused
Japan's export sector to contract. Real
gross national product in the second and
third quarters of 1986 was up less than
3%over1985 levels.
A real growth rate of only 2.3% is
the average forecast of 20 major
private research organizations for
fiscal 1986 (April 1986 to 1arch 1987).
This would be the lowest level
since the 19714 slump induced by the
first oil crises ———Japanhas lost
the ability to be a locomotive of
growth for the world economy as other
countries had hoped.
Indeed the statistics show that the index of growth in
industrial production has steadily declined from 6.5% in the
114second quarter of 1985 to —1.2%in the last quarter (Jan.—
March 1987) of 1986 (Figure 14).
The yen shock has had a devastating effect on employment. It is
estimated that in 1986 the number of "surplus" employees reached
about 100,000 just in the 1457manufacturing and shipping
companies listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange
and 900,000 for the manufacturing sector as a whole. If firms
were to lay off all of those excess workers, the unemployment
rate would jump from the present 3% level to 5%. The Keidanren's
survey shows that major steel and shipbuilding companies have
already closed some plants and factories, resulting in a 20 —i40%
reduction in employment. (See Table 3.)
This is exactly what is expected from the economic adjustment
resulting from the yen appreciation. Under the circumstan3es
what is needed is for Japan to close the gaps created by the high
yen by taking 'positive' action in stimulating her domestic
economy. The 'positive' action is for the benefit of Japan as
well as for the benefit of Japan's trade partners.
14. Capital Movement
Japan experienced net outflow of capital by $37 billion in
19814, $55 billion in 1985 and approximately $70 billion in 1986.
The expanded outflow of Japanese capital went mainly to the U.S.
in the form of the purchase of securities and other financial
instruments. The bond investment in 1985 constituted a more than
eight—fold increase over 19814. Financial investments in the U.S.
by Japanese institutions represented the 'positive' aspect of the
15Table 3. Employment Cuts at Major Corporations
iductiofl in Share of
iiiiinh(:r oftotal zLaIf
I U ) I oye es I in pie inc n I 110 n
Iron %U
• K.,;t:)d :.;l.:i:l ,:gj0 21.6 Apr. 1937—Mar. 1960
Kobe Steel 6,000 21.4 Scp( 10tt6••Mr. 1060
•
Nippon Steel i,OU0 20.3 Apr. 1907—Mair. 1001
Shipbuilding
Hitachi Zoseri '1,085 39.7 Spt. -Dec. 1956
Ishikawaji in a• H anna • ea' ndutri (i,1100 26.1 Oct.-Dcc. 1936
Kawasaki Heavy
Industries 22.1 Sept. 1956-Mar. 1955
Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries 1,100 2.3 Jan. 1937-Apr. 1959
litsui Engineering
& Shipbuilding 2,500 23.4 Apr.-Sept. 1986
Sumitomo Heavy
• Industries 1,700 22.4 Jan.-Mar. 1987
Automobiles
Isuzu Motors 300 2.0 Nov. 1986-Jan. 1987
NissanMotor 2,500 4.4 June1985-Dec. 1986
Source:Keidanrents surveytrade imbalance in goodsand services,because they are
complementary in supplying much needed funds for the U.S.
institutions and in preventing the U.S. interest rates from
rising.They not only provided necessary stimulus to the bond
and stock markets in the U.S., but also helped manufacturing and
other non—financial institutions to invest in physical and real
investments.
Figure Ldepictsinternational transactions of the banking
sector.In interbank credit, the proportion of the Euromarket,
the U.S. and offshore centers have had high relative weight,
while Japan's weight has also risen noticibly in recent years.
Japan is increasing playing an important role in the World
finance as its trade surplus is channelled into the cycle of
world economic development. In this respect, Japan is not
Merchantilist!
Investment in external and foreign assets by Japanese residents
was liberalized in 1980,andsincethenthe Japanese,
particularly, institutional investors such as life and non—life
insurance companies participated in the foreign markets with a
wide range of investments. Figure 5 shows the outstanding
balances of foreign securitiesheld bythe institutional
investors.
The external financial assets held by a country can be regarded
as an accumulated surplus of international balance of payments
(current account balance). Many believe that the present
huge surplusin Japan's current account is a transitory
16pnenomenon associated with the "development stage of an immature
creditor country". From the macroeconomic point of' view, Japan's
accumulation of external assets has meaning in terms of "saving
for a rainy day", because the present surplus is not the result
of incomes generated from the past investments abroad associated
with the stage of'a "mature creditor nation." The financial
aspect of the U.S. —Japanrelations is more apparent than the
commodity trade aspect.4e may simply observe how the Japanese
and also American investors acted rationally from the global
point of' view, selecting optimal combinations of' liquidity,
return ana risk.
Statistics prepared from L4F's publication (Table14 and Figure
6) can be used to illustrate the U.S. Japan differences in return
and risks. The table shows that investment return of' U.S. bonds
has been relatively high in recent years which induced the
Japanese investors to purchase U.S. securities. The risk
measured in terms of standard deviation is associated with return
higher in U.S. bonds than Japanese bonds. Risk on capital
gain/loss is associated with fluctuations of the exchange rate.
Japanese investors attempted to avoid such exchange rate risk.
Return and risk also depend on both domestic and foreign
inflation rates.
5.IndustrialStructure and Technology
It is clear that the present imbalance of' trade is due to both
the "export—prone" nature of the Japanese economy and the
"import—prone" nature of the U.S. economy. These "surplus—prone"
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Exhange earring rate 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Comprcensic earning rate 10.64 9.69 10.53 .9.84 3.92 A 6.11 14.46 11.94 4.63
Source: Economic Planing Agency (1986).and tideficit_pronet?cnaracteristics are closely related to the
corporate behaviorin each country.
First we observe that the elasticity of imports of finished
industrial goods is much higher in the U.S. than in Japan and
that the relative weight of intermediate goods in the overall
import of industrial goods is high in Japan, while in the U.S.
the relative weight of capital goods and consumer durables is
high. (See Table 5).These differences constitute the gaps in
the import behavior in the two countries.
Corporate behavior in the two countries may be compared by
studying the management objectives in Japan and in the U.S.
Table 6 summarizes the comparison of management objectives in
Japan and the U.S. The figures are the average scores given in
rankorder by the respondent (top being 3 points). The U.S.
companies emphasize the rate of return and the profit rate as
their primary objective, while Japanese managers emphasize the
market snare objective more than other objectives. "High stock
prices" rank as a top priority in the U.S. but it is the least
desirable objective for the Japanese companies. American
perception of the typical Japanese corporation is that managers
take care of workerst welfare. As far as the working condition
are concerned, both American and Japanese managers pay very
little attention to this problem.
Another revealing aspect of Table 6 shows that Japanese
managers emphasize introduction of new products more thantheir
counterparts in the U.S. (1.06 vs 0.21). Japan's export prices
18Table 5. Import of Industrial.. Products in Japan and the U.S.
(1) Ticnd in dctn3M .04 intpo:* by goudi (or Jap n4 thc U.S.
(2) Traruirionin.mporrcompot;..n rat.') by 900-il
(Inertia. rare ofl 934 ipinit 1980. %)
(5) lJi#inl () (U.S.)
':JLJU:
1:1
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- 2 1.5 17.4 a 3.4 37.9 97.3 43.4
Durable conlumee goo1s 27.5 16.0 a 9.0 .48.5 32$ 23.1
Son-durable coniumer good, 17.0 (3.4 a 3.1 28.1 95.8 32.8
Interim good. . 4.0 15.8 11.3 13.2 43.3 21.7Table 6. Comparison of Manageent Objectives
Corpo:a(cobJccUvc U.S. Jpn
P.alcof return on inyrncnI CR01) 2.43 1.24
Lncrcicin ock piic 1.14 0.02
Mzs3.ctsharc. 0.73 1.43
improYng product portfolio o.so 0.68
Ratonthttion of prodct on 2nd physic.z.1 dti abut on s in 046 0 71
Nct wdrthaLj 0.38 0.59
Ratio 6(nwproduct . 0.21. 1.06
linproirtt thcsocbl image of thc comp3ny 0.05 0.20
1r.iprovworkintcozditior 0:04 0.09
Source:Tadao Kagono, A Comparison of Management of Japanese
and U.S. Companies (inJapanese). Tokyowent up 2.6 times between 1970 and l98, almost the same rate as
the export prices of' advanced countries of' 2.7 times.The labor
cost in yen in the Japanese manufacturing industry went up only
0.2%, due to the high rate of' productivity growth compared with
32.5% in the U.S. If we take the present depreciated dollar as
the index, the Japanese labor cost rose 31.2%, which implies
that, as far as the price competitiveness due to labor cost is
concerned, the U.S. and Japan are on par because of the recent
appreciation of the yen.
Advantages in quality competition come from many factors—
including product design, delivery date, customer service and
etc., not to mention the quality of the product. Although it is
difficult to substantiate the claim that Japanese products are
always better in quality, the low break—down rate, high quality
of after—sale service of Japanese cars, and the high resolution
of video cassette recorders are the commonly accepted customer
perception. These market and "technological" know—hows are
responsible for the success of Japanese products.
Japan has already achieved a high state of technological
efficiency in the basic materials industry, a high flexibility in
small and medium-size subcontracting firms, and general "process"
innovations used to improve the existing products to newer and
more reliable products. Total Quality Circles movement and
Flexible l1anufacturing Systems to respond to diversified demands
have all contributed to the superiority of Japanese products.
The Office of Science and Technology (Figure 7) estimated the
19overall technology gap of Japan with respect to the U.S. and
other advanced countries. Although Japan is still behind in the
general technology of the other advanced countries, in some areas
it has already surpassed them. The "technological power" of
Japan is certainly responsible for a high growth rate of Japan's
success in export markets.
Japan's surge in the export industry is not by accident.From
the historical point of view, Japan now enjoys the third stage of
the so—called "product cycle". The development of a given
industry is supposed to undergo a product cycle of importing,
import substitution, export growth, maturity and reverse import.
The Japanese export industry is now at the third stage or export
growth phase, where the growth of the domestic demand slows down
but production increases and export surges (Vernon and Akamatsu).
The product cycle is usually associated with changes in quality,
investment and technology cycles.
OECD statistics are usually used to indicate a clearer picture
of the product cycle theory. (Though we will not reproduce them
here because of the limitation of space). It is known that large
export products such as steel, televisions, automobiles,and
machine tools are already approaching the mature stage in Japan,
while semiconductors and computers are still in the growth stage,
while aircraft is in the infant and importing stage, but apparel
and furniture are in the reverse importing stage.In the U.S.,
the product cycle in these industries proceeded the Japanese
cycle, which explains why Japan tends to export morethan the
20U.S.
Perhaps South Korea may become the most fierce competitorto
Japan and therefore to the U.S.South Korea has been steadily
narrowing the gap in technology vis—a—vis Japan,the United
States and Europe. For instance, direct foreigninvestments in
South Korea increased sharply from $150 millions per year on the
average between 1970 and 1975 to $300millions between 1981 and
1985. Technology import from Japan was $16 million in 1915, but
reached $63 million in 19814.
In adopting the strategy of global production andbuilding
their productionbases outsidethe U.S., the major U.S.
corporations caused the so—called "Hollowing—OutEffect" in
America. Electric machinery, transportation machinery and other
traditional manufacturing industries moved their production and
distribution facilities overseas.
The "Hollowing—Out" resulted in decline in the technological
capabilities of the industries that remained inthe U.S., which
is also responsible to the one—sided surge of imports. Changes
in therelativeposition in theoverall technological
competitivenessarepartlyresponsible for the long—term
imbalances. Figure 8 depicts relative competitiveness measuredin
terms of export price index. After the end of 1980 the Japanese
competitivness steadily improved over the U.S. competitivness,
while S. Korea proves to be a strong competitor to Japan.
The difference in the income elasticity of export among Japan,
tne U.S. and S. Korea (see Table 2 i.e. Japan:2.21, U.S.1.13 and
21S. KorealI.2)suggests that these three countries are at
different stages of the product cycle. Also trade (im)balance of
each country is strongly related with the competitiveness (price
index) and the export elasticity (See Figure 9)Thatis, the
U.S. current account has been deteriorating steadily since the
early 1960s, while the S. Korean current account hasbeen
improving and Japan can .basically maintain surplus since the
beginning of 1970 except for the periods of energy crises. If
Japan is unable to develop new growth in product innovation in
the future, it is very possible that it will move into the stage
of maturation like the U.S.
The exchange rate and real wage rate anc competitiveness are
closely related. When we comparethe wage rate at Y260=$l, which
is the exchange rate in February 1985, the wage rate in Japan
becomes 5L% of the U.S. wage rate, the exchange ratein May, 1987
is Y140=$1. If we use this base, the Japanese wage rate is
almost equal to the U.S. wage rate. Japan's wagerate vis-a—viS
S. Korea was approximately
Lttimes in l984. Now it almost
doubled in 1987.
The yen appreciation has also had the effectof shortening the
product cycle. This may be seen from the comparisonof
productivity difference among the threecountries, Japan, the
U.S. and S. Korea. (See Figure 10) In steel and nonferrous
metals industries, the S.Korean productivity growth is so high
that neither the U.S. nor Japan can evercatch up to it. S.
Korea has achieved the position of superiorityin a much shorter
22period than any other country.
The main characteristic of Japanese technological development
has been first to import technology from abroad and then to add
process innovation for quality improvementand cost reduction.
Thus,Japan was able to catch up to Western technology by adopting
the imitation and latecomer strategy. The second advantage that
Japan had in developintg her own technology of processinnovation
was-that products were mainly for the use of the private sector
and for non—defense related use.In the United States, on the
other hand R & D as a whole has been directed mainly toward
defense research, and scientists and engineers have closely
worked for the defense—related industries.Looking atR & D
expenditures financed by the government in variouscountries,
Japan and the U.S. have almost identical figures of approximately
O.6 of national income, while European countries like W. Germany
and France spend much more. The tax burden in Japan and the U.S.
are also very similar.
One advantage of Japan is obviously that Japan could almost
freely use the basic technology developed by otheradvanced
countries, notably the U.S. The basic technology usually results
from the non—commercial or defense—related R & D expenditures.
Technology and productivity are closely related and so are
productivity and employment systems. The JapanProductivity
Center's recent survey (Figure 11) compares how Japanese and
American managementviews individualability development.
Japanesecompaniesshowa stronger tendency in actively
23encouraging their employees to develop new skills than American
companies. Also Japanese corporations look at the effect of
educational training from the long—term point of view. This is
understandablein view of the fact that Japan has the custom of
"lifetime" employment system. Also "On the Job—Training" is much
more emphasized in Japan than in America. These management
practices may have the indirect effect on the strength of the
Japanesecorporation and thus on the trade imbalance ultimately.
6. Trade Barriers and Openness of the Japanese Market
In aneffort to sidetrack the protectionist sentiments growing
in theU.S. and to give the impression that progress was being
made in opening up the Japanese marketplace to American goods and
services, the akasone government announced "The Action Program
for Improved Market Access" in July 30, 1985. The Official
Government Bulletin of the Japanese government published in April
1987 assesses the results of the "action" taken by Japan. As
"the Action Program is hard to sum up briefly because it is so
comprehensive and it is even harder to evaluate the program's
impact quantitatively, hence the charge that it has had only a
cosmetic effect," the publication cites three examples where
progress ismade and improvements are forthcoming:
t.elecomunnications equipment, automobiles, and wine.
Example 1 : The telecommunication market was liberalized in
April 1985 when Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) was made a
private corporation.The Action Program removed all tariffs on
telecommunications equipment in January 1986. The number of
24technical standards for terminal equipment was reduced from 53 to
21.As a result, approvals for foreign terminal equipment jumped
from 25 cases in 19814 to 103 cases in 1985. Japan communications
satellite placed an order with Hughes Communications for two
satellites and related ground facilities. In December 1985, NTT
reached a contract with Northern Telecom Inc. for the purchase of
digital switching system —thefirst foreign purchase. Ford
Aerospace Communications succeeded in the sale of communication
satellites to Japan. These purchases amounted to the increase of
Japanese imports by $800 million.
Example 2 : (Automobiles): Tariffs on finished automobiles were
completely eliminated in April 1978. Tariffs on automobile parts
were virtually abolished by January 1986. The effect of the
Action Program is seen as the doubling of import value for one
year. Figure 12 shows a sharp increase of imported carsafter
the Action Program was implemented. But it is noted that imports
of the U.S. made automobiles has virtually unchanged, while a
sharp increase of imports came from European cars. Thisis
considered as a reflection of' preferences of Japanese consumers.
Example 3 : (Wine): Under the Action program the tariffs on
imported wine was reduced to 20% in April 1986, and 30% in April
1987. Imports of' American wine have risen from 1,333 kiloliters
in 19814 to 2.5014 kiloliters in the first 11 months of 1986.
Generally speaking, Japan's tariffs on imported goods have been
the lowest among advanced countries. On January 1, 1986, tariffs
on 1,8149 items were either completely eliminated or reduced by an
25average of 20%. Non—tariff barriers such as import restrictions,
standard and certification systems have also been eliminated.
The so—called Mossnegotiations (MarketOriented Sector
Selective) between the U.S. and Japan have also contributed to
the elimination of not only tariffs but also non—tariff barriers.
Standards and certification systems and import procedures are
established in any country to protect life and health, consumer
interests, the environment, and cultural and traditional values
to a certain extent.To take account of the average physical
sizeof the Japanese, a cold medicine, "Contac", made in Japan is
60% less in size and potency than intheU.S.A. Japan now
accepts more foreign test data than ever before and recognizes
the results of foreign testing organizations.Foreign companies
also have easier access to the JIS (Japan Industrial Standards)
marks on the manufactured goods.
Representatives of foreign interests in Japan have taken part
inmeetings of 51 councils to express their views, and 617
foreign representatives have participated in the "standard—
settingcommittees." In many cases when standards arechanged,it
isnot the U.S. but other advanced countries and some developing
countries that benefit the most, thereby resulting in a relative
decline of American imports.
Government procurement has also increased bynearly 80%
according to the Bulletin. But like the case of the Kansai
Airport construction,manyAmericancontractorswant to
participate in the market simply by subcontracting with Japanese
26and/or foreign (mostly Korean) subcontractors. In other words,
American contractors do not directly or indirectly use their
comparative advantage.
Financial and capital markets have also been liberalized.The
government began public offerings of Japanese Treasury Bills for
the first time in 1986.The Action Program has given foreign
financial institutions improved access to Japan's market. Nine
foreign banks have already received licenses to engage in trust
banking and the Tokyo Stock Exchange admitted 10 new members,six
of them foreign securities companies.
Even a journalistic article from Tokyo correspondents of major
American newspapers concede that the Japanese are importing much
more, but that the U.S. lags compared with other countries.The
May 16, 1987 issue of the Hew York Times reports that although
the Nakasone government's campaign to buy foreign goods has been
succeeding, imports from the United States have not increased
dramatically. Imports from Europe and such newly industrializing
countries as Taiwan and S. Korea have shown far larger gains.
The explanations for the relative lag in American imports vary
widely, but American goods face a distinct image problemin
Japan. Where European goods have an image ofluxury and
craftmanship and Asian goods have compelling price advantages,
the Japanese suspect the quality of American goods with higher
prices —Americangoods do not have a brand—name image. (This
point is also confirmed by Figure 12).
Some Japanese blame American companies for not trying hard
27enough to modify their products to Japanese taste. For example,
few foreign companies were willing to modify dress patterns in
order to make them fit better to Japanese bodies. But there are
many success stories in Japan.Mister Donut, which has changed
its doughnut recipe to make them less sweet in Japan, is one of
the most successful companies in Japan.Table 7 shows examples
of'successfulAmerican businesses in Japan.
7. Looking Ahead
There are some encouraging signs on the horizon to reduce the
trade imbalance. Trade statistics released by the U.S. Commerce
Department in the beginning of May, 1987 shows that American
exports to Japan continued to increase in March 1987 rising to
$2.114 billion, from $2.03 billion inFebruary.Japan bought 12.6
percent more goods from the U.S. in 1986 that in 1985.
The strongyen iscausing manyJapanese companies to
"reimport" their own products from the United States. For
example, the Honda i4otor Company is considering reimporting
passenger cars produced in the U.S.
One important statistic shown in Table 8 is that although total
import value in 1986 decreased by 2.3%, it came largely fromthe
reduction of oil prices. The import value of fuels decreased by
33.6%, while practically all the other items in import have
increased ranging 97% increase in motor vehicles and 52.4%
increase in nonmetal mineral products. The import value of
manufactured goods has a hefty increase of 31.3% in 1986, now
comprising il.7% of total imported value.
28The Japanese government as well as the business community has
been obsessed with the idea that the government budget has to be
balanced, before measures for expansionary domestic demand are
adopted.Mr. Inayama's "Gaman—no—Testsugaku" was the philosophy
often said to be responsible for this sentiment, as mentioned in
the beginning of this paper.The consensus was, then, first
close the gap of the budget deficit by implementing indirect
taxes, specificallyEuropean value—added tax system. The
government proposal of this new tax submitted in the fallof 1986
was completely defeated by the objection of the opposition
parties and the so—called "people's power."This is fortunate
from the long range point of view, because a bigger government is
usually associated with the value—added tax system as evidenced
by the European countries. The problem here is that the Japanese
government and the ruling LDP party have spent practically their
total political energy on the passage of the tax law, rather
than, the passage of import stimulating measures.Here is the
case of a priority gap between the U.S. and Japan. The U.S.'s
priority was to see that Japan spends more effort on reducing the
trade imbalance, rather than on instituting a new tax system
which will in many cases reduce domestic effective demand. The
Japanese priority was, first, to institute a new tax system which
will enable the government to expand public expenditures at a
later stage.
It is hard to project what the Japanese government will do to
stimulate domestic demand, other than saying "specific measures
29have already taken...", because the fundamental philosophy and
mentality have not changed,_even with the strong appreciati'on of
the yen and Reagan's tariff on certain electronic products.
Rice Deregulations:
In September 1986 the U.S. Rice Miller's Association surprised
many Japanese by filing a complaint with the Office ofTiade
Representatives, charging that Japan's rice policy constituted an
unfair practice. Since rice, thestapleof the Japanese diet and
the mainstay of the farm sector, has been granted a waiver under
the GATT agreement, this U.S. move had not been anticipated. The
nature of agriculture in any country is shaped by that country's
history, climate and topography and the people's dietary habits
and cultureal patterns. But Japan today is faced with the need
to build up a highly productive and competitive agricultural
sector. Even the Keidanren now recognizes this need for change.
Their projection suggests that it will take five to ten years
before the Japanese farms can be reorganized into considerably
larger units.The current policy for preventing a rice surplus
has discouraged farmers from working to improve productivity and
reduce costs of operation. Together with the improvement of the
distribution system, the Japanese agricultural sector must be
developed to a viable industry. The basic difference weshould
observe in dealing with less productive sectors of the Japanese
economy compared with the method of coping with suchsectors in
the U.S. is that Japan tries to improve that sector rather than
conceding to the foreign pressure and importing rice from say,
30the U.S. The traditional comparative cost theory suggeststhat
Japan abandon the agricultural sector, whilethe U.S. abndons
some sector less efficient.This approach is valid, provided
that the Japanese agriculture will never be more productivein
the long run.American industries tend to abandon the sector
without even trying.This is another reason why Japan tends to
win a competitive edge over the other country, even in the area
where there exists an obvious disavantage in Japan. This does
not suggest that Japan's agriculture will be more competitive
than the U.S. in the near future.
This being the case, the U.S. should not expect that Japan will
open the agricultural market now,which will improve the trade
imbalance. In fact, the U.S. should expect that Japan will fight
to the tilt to preserve the traditonal sector, while payingmuch
attention to make the sector more productive and competitive.
The Keidanren'S proposal of the two stage approach (thefirst
stage =partialprivate production and thesecond stage =
reductionof the government control of rice) is exactly the
Japanese method of solving the rice problem.
The Mayekawa Report and Restructuring
The Mayekawa report also suggests the expansion ofdomestic
demand, but Mayekawa himself concedes that "a serious policy
concern relating to domestic demand expansion is howto do it..."
(Recent speech at the Center for Japan—U.S. Business and Economic
Studies at New York University on April 10, 1987). This is due
to:
31(1) Budget deficit of the Japanese government;
(ii) High and rising land prices which are the major
impediment to the housing, and construction industry;
(iii) Japan's existing "export—prone" structure itself;
(iv) Regulations for domestic expansionsuch as in
housing and other construction industries.
The Keidanren maintains that at the current rate the yen is
clearly overvalued and should be stabilized to a more appropriate
level and that the government should make some effort to realize
such an appropriate level. At the same time the U.S. should be
more concerned about its budget deficit. Unless some effective
measures are taken immediately, the "Hollowing—Out" of the
Japanese industries will be unavoidable like the case of many
U.S. industries. Japan's total direct overseas investment
exceeded $10 billion in fiscal 1984 and reached $12.2 billion in
1985. What does this do to Japan and the rest of the world?
Certainly it will increase some form of "hollowing—out" effect to
Japan but it will bring more jobs to other countries.
Japan still has a long way to go in terms of real improvement
in the standards of living.Problems of social capital, and
housing being the numberone priority,cannot be solved
overnight. There is a group of economists who advocate the
efficient use of savings (i.e. investment in physical capital)
within the domestic territory of Japan, for improvement of social
capital and housing accomodation, while realizing that some
savings must certainly be invested abroad. However, it iseasily
32said but very difficult to be done. Japan's future is as
difficult as eliminating the imbalance of trade withthe rest of
the world.
33Table 7.Successful Aitici-ican Rusinesses in Japan
Examples of SiccessfuI AmercanBusiesscsin Japan
Market share
Product Name of mInL l. ::iurcr (%)
(;n lion:iied I)cvtI itJ:; (tjt:—( :
Powdcrcd zoup CF'C Ii ernatio:kIl I.e.
(Knorr) 80
Canned ;oup CF C Inwmation.IhL:.
(Knorr) 30
i3reaklast cereals Kellogg 80
Ointment Johnson & Johnson 31
Floor wax S.C. Johnson & Son, Co. 30
Car Wax S.C. Johnson & Son, Co. 20
Deodorants American Drug 59
Odorants S.C. Johnson Er Son, Co. 21
Bulldozers Caterpillar Tractor 43
Panel heaters Koehring, Nosty Corp. 50
Computers1 IBM
Instant cameras Polaroid 45
Instant carncra Eastman Kodak 45
Stem wine glasses Owens-lllinoi:; Inc. GO
luppcrware - Raxall Drug & Ci e nicil Co. 30
Source:MITITable 8. Trend of Japanese Imports
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35Appendix 1: Factor Analysis
Growth gaps are computed from export and import functions
for Japan and the U.S.A. (See Economic Planning Agency [1986]):
Export
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R2 0.832 S.E. =0.033 DI =1.387
Import
Japan: in (RIJP) = —5.812 +0.725in(RDJP)





36R2 0.701 S.E. 0.035 DW =0.8143
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37Appendix 2 : J—Curve Effect
The increase in Japan's trade surplus attributable to the
yen's appreciation is calculated from the following table:







































J—curve for Exports 968
for Apr.— Imports 58
June, 1986 Balance 910











38Figure 1. Trade Imbalances c.f Japan and the U.S.A.
Sources: Calculated from Economic Planning Agency [1986]
and IMF's statistical year books.Figure 2.Growth Gaps in Japan ar.d the U.S.A.
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